

















































Time, Mind and Aristotle.  
An Interview with 
Thomas Crowther
 
1. Can Our First-Person Experience Tell Us Anything About the Nature 
of Time?
In brief, I think our first-person experience can tell us something about the 
nature of time. But I think this for reasons that differ from those have often 
been offered for answering this question affirmatively.
Let me begin with a bit of background. The story of 20th cen-
tury philosophy of time was a tale of two warring factions; with so-called 
“A-theorists” on the one side and “B-theorists” on the other. These unusu-
al-sounding names derive from important ideas that were articulated in 
the work of the Cambridge philosopher John M. Ellis 
McTaggart. 1 Crudely put, “A-theorists” believe that 
the distinction between past, present and future (the 
“A-series”) is a feature of temporal reality itself. There 
really is a time that is the present, and so there really is 
a past and a future. This is captured by the claim that 
“reality is tensed”. A-theorists also believe that there is a 
dynamic aspect to time; that time really passes. My typ-
ing this sentence is a present event but it will soon be-
come part of my past. And my lunch will move from the 
future into the present, and then it will become past. 2 
B-theorists are philosophers who think that the distinc-
tion between past, present and future is not a feature of 
the temporal world itself. They think that this distinc-
tion is merely a matter of how we view things, rather than a matter of how 
things are out there independent of us. They think that temporal reality it-
self is a series of times and events the relations between which can be un-
derstood simply in terms of temporal notions such as “earlier than”, “later 
than” or “simultaneous with” (the B-series). Notice these relations are com-
pletely independent of notions of past, present or future. One can in prin-
ciple know that 2030 is earlier than 2040 without knowing whether 2030 
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and the distinction itself contin-
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tiny, 21st century discussion in 
the philosophy of time is still 
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or 2040 is in the past, present or future. B-theorists also deny that time is 
dynamic, that time is something that really passes. This denial is often cap-
tured by the idea that B-theory is a block view of time. The times and events 
that constitute temporal reality are all in existence in the way that the dif-
ferent marked parts of a 12 inch wooden ruler are all 
in existence. 3 I incline towards taking various claims 
characteristically advanced by A-theorists – such as the 
claim that “reality is tensed”, and that “there is such a 
thing as temporal passage” – to be true. But I am scep-
tical about the way that experience has tended to enter 
into debates about the truth of claims of this kind.
At the very least, it is at least natural to reconstruct some of these 
arguments for the A-theory that have been offered in 
the literature in the following way: 4
1. When we reflect on first-person experience it 
seems to us that reality is tensed/there is such 
a thing as temporal passage.
2. The best explanation of its seeming to us that reality is tensed/there is such 
a thing as temporal passage is that reality is tensed/there is such a thing as 
temporal passage.
3. Therefore reality is tensed/there is such a 
thing as temporal passage. 5
Here, first-person experience is playing an epistem-
ic role: it provides one with justification for various 
A-theoretic claims about the metaphysics of time.In the recent literature, 
most B-theorists have characteristically rejected (2), arguing that there 
are better explanations of the character of temporal experience consist-
ent with taking reality to be tenseless or to involve 
no passage at all. 6 But it is an assumption common 
to A-theorists who argue in this way, and to many of 
the B-theorists who oppose it, that the very notions 
of “tensed reality” and “temporal passage” that figure 
in the formulation of this argument are sufficiently well-understood in 
the first place. I don’t think this is right. It is a familiar point that many of 
the traditional characterizations of temporal passage 
are either incoherent or remain uncashed metaphors. 7 
But I think it is no less true that there is an insufficient-
ly clear grasp of what it is for reality to be tensed. In 
particular, I think that the literature does not contain 
a satisfying discussion of the very idea of what it is for 
something to be in the present. I think that reflection 
on first-person experience can help us in trying to make some headway 
with these basic questions concerning the very content of such notions 
as “tensed reality” or “temporal passage”. This, in my view, is where expe-
rience – at least most fundamentally – comes into debates about the phi-
losophy of time. It is a further story exactly what such reflection tells us 
about these notions. Telling this story is one of the themes of my research 
in this area.
3 For important examples of the 
B-theory in the earlier part of the 
20th century see Smart (1949) 
and Williams (1951). More recent 
work includes Mellor (1998), 
Oaklander (1984), Le Poidevin 
(1991), and Dyke (2008).
4 This kind of argument is at 
least suggested in passages of 
Dainton (2011) for example.
5 Reconstructions of arguments 
for the A theory like this play an 
important role in the arguments 
in Paul (2010) and Dyke (2008).
6 This is the line taken by 
Paul (2010), Dyke (2008, ch.2), 
and other B-theorists such 
as Prosser (2016, ch.7).
7 Scorn for A-theorists’ attempts 
to articulate the relevant features 
of the manifest world is a theme of 
some of the classic mid-20th cen-
tury work on the B-theory. See, for 
particularly good examples of this, 



































































Returning to the kind of argument we have just been consider-
ing, this leaves it open whether experience has any epistemic role to play in 
debates about time, once such questions about the content of the notions 
up for dispute have been clarified and made determinate. One thought here 
might be that once these questions have been settled, then we are still faced 
with the task of providing an argument for the claim that notions such as 
“the present” or “temporal passage” actually have application. And it may be 
that experience then has a role to play in providing a premise in those argu-
ments, much as the argument in (1)-(3) above. 8 That 
may be so. But there are other possibilities. For one to 
even entertain the thought that object is that colour 
(a kind of thought that philosophers call a ‘perceptu-
al-demonstrative’) it is necessary that there is in fact 
an object in front of one, that one perceives, that has some perceived col-
our. If someone is indeed entertaining a perceptual-demonstrative thought 
of some kind, then there is not a further step to be taken to establish that 
the concepts involved in the demonstrative have application in their envi-
ronment, let alone a further step to which experience of a certain kind may 
be relevant in providing a premise. The very conditions required for some-
one to entertain such a perceptual-demonstrative thought are sufficient in 
themselves for the existence of the things which are the referents of the 
concepts that constitute the content of the thought.
Given what I have said here, it remains open that the situation 
is somewhat similar in the case of the temporal notions we have been dis-
cussing. That is, it is possible that the conditions required for one to have a 
grasp on the concepts of “the present” or of “temporal passage” – where 
those notions are clear and determinate enough to frame fruitful debates 
about the nature of time – are such that the obtaining of these conditions 
guarantees that these concepts have application. Were this the case, there 
would be no need for an independent argument for the existence of the 
present or of passage, an argument in which experience of a certain type 
functioned as an independent premise (as in the argu-
ment (1)-(3) above). 9 These are complex and delicate 
questions that go well beyond what I can go into here.
Before moving on from this question, I ought to men-
tion a familiar worry about taking first-person experi-
ence to tell us anything much about the nature of time. 
Briefly put, the thought is that contemporary physics 
simply tells us that reality is tenseless and there is no 
such thing as temporal passage.
This raises many further questions that I can-
not possibly do justice to here. Of course it triggers the 
worries about contentfulness that I have just talked 
about. But setting this aside for the moment, what I 
think, very crudely, is that the notion of time that physicists operate with 
– and that informs the work of many philosophers of time – is just a differ-
ent notion of time from that which I am attempting to better understand in 
my research (and others like me are). I am primarily interested in providing 
an account of the nature of manifest time. Manifest time is time as it is re-
vealed to us in sense-perceptual experience of the world, and first-person 
8 For an example of this view of the 
role of experience in general met-
aphysics see Lowe (1998, ch.1).
9 I emphasize that the claim here 
is not that experience will thereby 
be irrelevant in constituting the rel-
evant truth about how things are. 
For it will be open to argue that the 
occurrence of experience of a cer-
tain kind plays a constitutive role in 
a grasp of the relevant notion of the 
present or of the notion of passage 
(in a similar way that it is likely to 
be argued that the occurrence of 
experience of a certain kind plays 
a constitutive role in the capac-




































































reflection on that experience. It is not that I am not interested in that other 
notion of time, or that I take it to be irrelevant to metaphysics. I just suspect 
that there is much less substantive disagreement here than there might 
seem to be at first sight.
2. Some Philosophers Have claimed that Our Experience of Time Eludes 
Our Attempt to Capture Its Nature Conceptually. Artistic Practices 
Seem Better Suited to Express this Elusive Nature Than Philosophical 
Reflection. What do You Think of this Claim?
There are two different but related ideas here. Let me deal with them sep-
arately. I am inclined to think that there is something right about both of 
them, but with the caveat that each of these suggestions really raises many 
more questions than it answers.
The first claim is that our experience of time is nonconceptu-
al. Let’s try to unpack this a bit. Experiences are phenomenally conscious 
events or processes. Drawing on an idea from Thomas Nagel (1974) one can 
say that experiences are events or processes such that “there is something 
that it is like for the subject” to be undergoing them, in the way that there 
is nothing it is like for a rock to be rolling down a slope.
What it is for an experience to be of time is potentially quite con-
troversial. But let me try to address this question in a way that does not 
commit us to too much on this front. Whichever side of these various de-
bates about time or temporal experience one is on, it ought to be relative-
ly uncontroversial that an experience as of some kind of change going on 
(e.g. a ball rolling along the lawn) or of stasis (e.g. an experience as of a cat 
just lying there motionless on the lawn) or of one occurrrence succeeding 
another (e.g. an experience as of one footstep following another) count as 
experiences of time in some reasonably broad sense. I think every philos-
opher of time would be able to agree that we have experiences of time in 
such a broad sense.
Now to the substance of the first question. The claim that one’s 
experience of time eludes our attempt to capture its 
nature conceptually might mean a number of things. 10 
But the usual way in which this claim has been under-
stood is as the claim that the subject can have an ex-
perience of time without the subject of the experience 
possessing the concepts that would be used to char-
acterize the content of the experience. 11 The “content” 
of the experience is how things seem to one in having 
the experience one does. In this case, the claim is that 
it would be possible for one to have experiences as of 
something changing, or as a cat in stasis on the lawn, or footstep follow-
ing footstep, without having the concepts of “change”, “stasis” or “x follows 
y”. There are different notions of a concept obviously, and a lot depends on 
how this notion is understood. But let’s assume – as it has been in debates 
of this kind – that having a concept, for example, the concept blackbird, 
consists in the ability to use the word “blackbird” correctly. Against this 
background, the idea that the experience of time is nonconceptual appears 
quite plausible. Those of us who have children will find it hard to resist the 
10 For different sides of this 
debate see Evans (1982) and 
McDowell (1994). See Crowther 
(2006) for argument that there 
are ambiguities in how this claim 
might be understood, ambigui-
ties that have an impact on how 
effective some of the impor-
tant arguments in this area are.



































































thought that even before our offspring came to understand the use of the 
words “change”, “stasis” or “succession”, they enjoyed experiences in which 
things seemed to them some way, a way that is characterizable in terms 
of these very temporal concepts. That shows that the possession of these 
concepts is not necessary for perceivers to have these experiences. It seems 
to me that one could make the same point on the basis of reflection on the 
experience of non-linguistic animals of various kinds.
This claim has generated quite a bit of discus-
sion in the literature over the last few decades. 12 I do 
not present the ideas I have just discussed as conclusive. 
But at the very least, the claim seems plausible. Even if 
it is conceded that this claim is plausible, though, some 
caveats need to be made. First, note that this is just a negative claim. It does 
not tell us a great deal about our temporal experience, nor exactly how the 
relevant temporal features of experience are to be explained. It says only 
they are not concept-dependent in the relevant way. That leaves many dif-
ferent options open about what the positive story is.
Second, it does not follow from this that there aren’t any tem-
poral experiences with conceptual content. Think of the differences in the 
kind of perceptual engagement involved in someone without any mu-
sic-theoretic training or understanding of musical form listening to a pi-
ano sonata by Mozart, and the auditory experience of an expert on sonata 
form like Charles Rosen, who is listening to the same piece of music. I think 
that the rich perceptual experience that Rosen has in such circumstances 
is something that wouldn’t be shared by one who knows nothing of mu-
sic theory or sonata form. And I think that the kind of auditory experience 
that Rosen is having wouldn’t have been available to him unless he had the 
conceptual capacities that are drawn on in his auditory experience of that 
piece of music.
The second part of this question involved the suggestion that ar-
tistic practice may express the nature of the experience of time better than 
philosophical reflection. This is a really interesting suggestion. A lot here, I 
think, depends on how exactly it’s understood.
The notion of “expression” is most naturally used to indicate the 
idea of something which is inner and (in some sense) private to the subject, 
being made outer and (in some sense) public. So we take someone’s crying 
to express their sadness, for example, or their furious shouting to express 
their rage. The fact that we talk about expression here seems to involve 
the idea that the subject does something with their body that serves as the 
public vehicle for something broadly internal, which is what’s expressed. In 
these cases, it is emotions of different kinds which are expressed.
Given that philosophical reflection, understood as deliberation 
about philosophical questions, does not essentially appear to involve do-
ing things with one’s body, one might worry about the degree to which it 
is expressive of anything. This, of course, is not to say that such reflection 
doesn’t manifest anything. As an exercise of creativity, intelligence or ra-
tionality, it clearly does manifest capacities that one possesses. But it is nor-
mal to distinguish expression from manifestation.
Against the background of this way of understanding the question, 
I think it’s true that artistic practice does express the nature of temporal 
12 See for example, McDowell 




































































experience better than philosophical reflection. But I think that this may be 
true in a sense that is not particularly interesting: philosophical reflection – 
as a mental rather than bodily action – doesn’t really express anything.
A different way to take the suggestion is as the idea that artis-
tic practices, like music, dance or drama, provide particularly good exam-
ples of the elusive temporal characteristics of experience. Specifically, they 
provide better examples than philosophical reflection does. I am inclined to 
agree. The temporal properties of such practices as music, dance and dra-
ma are so evident and important that it is hard to even begin to see how to 
make sense of them without thinking of their temporal properties.
But again, I want to hedge this agreement. Don’t forget that phil-
osophical reflection itself is something temporal, that is, it is something that 
goes on in time and over time. Philosophical reflection might involve, say, 
over the space of an hour, one trying to work out what Aristotle is saying 
about time in some passage of Book IV of the Physics, or involve trying to 
work out whether two sentences in the same paragraph of that work are 
consistent with one another. This is activity that goes on over time. One 
can narrate what went on over that time. One can say, it took me an hour 
to come to understand that the way I had read this paragraph previously 
was mistaken.
It is easy to forget that such reflection is temporal. There are many 
reasons for this. One obvious contributing factor is the sheer difficulty of 
the topic. If the temporal properties of experience are elusive, then even 
more so is arriving at an understanding of the temporal properties of such 
actions as thinking, reasoning and decision. I think there 
has been very little good work done on this. 13 Another 
is a tendency to run together philosophical reflection 
with the very idea of propositional contents and their 
relations. Consider the argument form below, in which 
1 and 2 are the premises and 3 is the conclusion. It is 
true, I think that the propositional contents, and the re-
lations between the contents communicated by this argument form:
 
1. p
2. If p then q
3. q
 
are atemporal and timeless. These atemporal and timeless properties are a 
bad fit for the temporal properties of experience. But 1-3 is not an instance 
of philosophical reflection. It is a written inscription that communicates re-
lations of implication between abstract contents. Philosophical reflection, 
on the other hand, is something that agents do, that may involve judging 
that such propositional contents are true, or imply one another, or may in-
volve deliberation about whether they are true or not. But such reflection is 
not to be identified with the contents themselves.
Even with that warning having been made, I still think it’s hard 
to deny the suggestion when it is understood in this way. Artistic practic-
es – in particular, music, dance, and drama – do provide better examples or 
models of the experience of the passage of time than does reflection. They 
and their temporal properties are publically observable and open to view. 
13 Here I’d refer the interested 
reader to Part II of Matthew 
Soteriou’s outstanding 2013 book 
The Mind’s Construction, for 
the best thing written on these 



































































But this isn’t true of philosophical reflection and mental activity in gener-
al. Indeed, nothing about the temporal properties of philosophical reflection 
seems obvious. (The idea that we are able to point our attention inside our-
selves to see the drama of our thinking unfold before an internal eye seems 
wrong to me, as a claim about the character of my own mental life).
Though I’m aware I’ve pursued this topic for too long anyway, I’d 
like to make a final point, because there is another way that the question 
might be read, and indeed is perhaps more likely to be read. This raises an 
important issue about philosophical enquiry more generally. And here I 
want to dissent from the suggestion rather than agree with it.
A different way that one might understand this suggestion is that 
there is an intrinsic difficulty in thinking that philosophical reflection can 
properly illuminate certain areas, because philosophical reflection is linguis-
tic and conceptual, and the relevant subject-matter is not. This is a general 
worry about philosophical theorizing that might apply much more widely 
than just to the case of temporal experience, but to other topics that seem 
to involve something ineffable, or inarticulable. According to this worry, 
“philosophical theory” is simply incapable of delivering the kind of illumina-
tion of these topics that philosophers might have hoped for, simply by vir-
tue of this distinction between the linguistic medium and the non-linguis-
tic subject matter. And it is this in-principle incapacity that provides for the 
possibility that illumination might be better provided by a form of engage-
ment that took place in a different medium, say, dance or music or poetry.
I should start by saying that I certainly don’t think that philosoph-
ical reflection has a monopoly on providing illumination and understanding. 
Of course the kinds of practices I have mentioned can do just that, in ways 
which are sometimes very subtle and difficult to discern, and at other times 
overwhelming and unmistakeable. Many of us spend a great deal of our lives 
allowing art to transform us in all of these ways.But with that being said, I 
think it’s important to resist the worry as I’ve just expressed it. The “me-
dium” of philosophical theory and the philosophical use of language is not 
some insurmountable barrier when it comes to engaging with subjects like 
this. It’s just the form within which philosophers work. Philosophical reflec-
tion in these areas can be done well, or it can be done badly. A good philoso-
pher ought never try to pretend that the relevant problems and challenges 
arising from the nature of the subject matter don’t exist. Doing this work 
well is hard. It requires creativity, and requires that philosophers find ways 
to draw on their own imaginative powers, and to draw on the imaginative 
powers of their readers. It requires exercising the capacity for insight and 
understanding, and putting this together with what might have to be a new 
way of conceptualizing the subject-matter; one that is capable of providing 
form for these exercises of insight and understanding. And all of this needs 
to be done in a way that makes one’s intellectual engagement with the – 
purportedly ineffable and inarticulable – subject-matter publicly accessible, 
in a form that invites and makes possible constructive critical engagement 
from other enquirers.
One might think that questions concerning aesthetic experi-
ence and aesthetic engagement are one of these areas in which philosoph-
ical theory might be a barrier to successful illumination of a subject-mat-



































































do here I’d encourage you to read some of Richard 
Wollheim’s magnificent work on these topics. 14 If the 
subject matter in question is the muddy and nuanced 
character of our ethical responses and the fine struc-
ture of our ethical life, read anything on these subjects by David Wiggins 
or Bernard Williams, or read Sarah Broadie’s extraordi-
nary book Ethics with Aristotle. 15 It is interesting here 
to note that the challenges that the philosopher faces 
are in fact quite similar to the challenges faced by those 
working in literature and poetry. It would be very odd 
to harbour reservations about the capacity of the nov-
el to illuminate character and emotional life because 
the fine details of character and emotional life are too 
delicate, intricate and subtle to be capturable or under-
standable through the crude tools of conceptual structure or linguistic ex-
pression. To this philosopher – and lover of literature – the work of Marcel 
Proust and Leo Tolstoy, amongst many others, would dispense with this 
line of thought pretty quickly.
I don’t think that any of this is accidental. I think that part of what 
will make for good philosophy in these areas is the ability of the philos-
opher to draw on imaginative capacities, skills of intelligent and creative 
insight and description, and focussed reflection on the world as it strikes 
them. These are just the capacities that are also required of good novelists. 
None of these skills comes (or stays) easy. These reflections prompt me to 
want to interrogate a bit further quite what the implied difference is be-
tween philosophical reflection and artistic practice, as we find it in the ques-
tion. But this answer is already becoming Proustian and Tolstoyan enough 
in its length, so I had better leave things here.
3. Do You Think Aristotle’s Reflections on Continuity May Still Be 
Relevant Today, After Georg Cantor Succeeded in Providing a 
Mathematical Formalization of the Continuum?
This is a very interesting question, and a question that is very difficult to 
give a satisfactory short answer to. There is so much that is controversial 
here. Hopefully some of my answers to other questions will help to fill out 
my thoughts about these issues a bit further.With the advent of set theory, 
in the work of Richard Dedekind, Karl Weierstrass and Georg Cantor, ma-
thematicians came to possess a system of powerful new techniques for un-
derstanding and representing notions of continuity and infinity which went 
far beyond anything that was available to Aristotle and his contemporaries.
Part of the new conception of continuity that underlay Cantor’s 
set-theoretic approach was the idea that it is possible to understand the 
notion of something continuous (or what Aristotle might have called “the 
infinite by division”) in terms of a set of points. That is a straightforward 
rejection of ideas about the relations between points and lines that we find 
Aristotle articulating in Book VI of the Physics. There – amongst many oth-
er things – Aristotle offers an argument for the view that we cannot un-
derstand a finite magnitude as a construction from a set of extensionless 
points, no matter how many points we add together. If Cantor is right – and 
14 See for example, Wollheim 
(1980) and Wollheim (1987).
15 See for example, Wiggins (1998), 
or the magnificent series of lec-
tures in Wiggins (2006). Williams 
(1985) is one of the most impor-
tant works in moral philosophy 
of the second half of the twenti-
eth century. Williams (1981) and 




































































the axioms of his set theory are generally accepted – then it might seem 
that this argument is a mistake.
I think that even if we accept that Cantor is right that we can rep-
resent continuity and ‘the infinite by division’ in a way that seems to be in-
consistent with what Aristotle says in Book VI of the Physics, there remain 
a number of ways in which Aristotle’s discussions of continuity remain rel-
evant for contemporary philosophy. I will mention just two, though I don’t 
think that these are exhaustive.
The first thing to say is that I think that Aristotle’s investigations 
of continuity in the Physics is quite circumscribed. My view is that even the 
most abstract and formal parts of the discussion of the notion of mathe-
matical continuity in Book VI are not intended to be descriptions of the re-
lations between magnitudes, quantities or objects, understood as abstract 
objects that have a determinate identity and reality completely independ-
ent of all connection to the natural world. They are discussions of formal 
and structural properties that are intended to be applicable to, or grounded 
in, the structural properties of the world that is the object of natural sci-
ence, that is, that world as manifest to us in our ordinary experience of it. In 
general, the Physics is an attempt to identify the principles of nature, and 
so, an attempt to understand such notions as “time”, “change” and “place” 
which are basic in the world as we find it in our everyday experience. Here 
is a place in Physics III.5 where Aristotle is speaking to this point: «Now, the 
issue here might be a very general one, including the question of whether 
there is a place for infinity among mathematical entities and among things 
which are intelligible and which have no magnitude. However, we are con-
ducting an investigation into perceptible things…» (Ph. 
204a34-a36). 16 This may reflect nothing more nor less 
than a specific application of Aristotle’s general views 
about mathematics. A familiar narrative in histories of 
the development of mathematics is that Aristotle just straight out rejected 
Plato’s idea that mathematics had a distinctive subject matter; a set of Forms 
or abstract objects, their properties and relations, which were metaphysi-
cally distinct from the objects of the sensible world. According to this nar-
rative, for Aristotle, mathematics can only be a high-level or general scope 
investigation of the formal or quantitative features of objects that can be 
encountered through the senses, whether we are talking about geometry 
or arithmetic. Unfortunately, from the few passages of the Metaphysics in 
which these questions come into focus, Aristotle’s views about mathemat-
ics – and in particular the ways in which his attitudes to mathematics differ 
from some of the different ideas about mathematics that we find in Plato – 
cannot be reconstructed in very much detail; or at least 
with very much confidence. 17 However, one doesn’t 
need to be committed to claims about Aristotle’s views 
of mathematics in general to think that in the Physics, 
the discussions of mathematical notions of continuity 
are intended to be discussions that capture facts about the notion of math-
ematical continuity that are applicable to the world of natural science as 
it is manifest to us in sense-perception. The lines quoted from III.5 above 
are evidence of that. And once one thinks about the notion of continui-
ty in this way – as an attempt to spell out certain formal features of the 
16 In this passage I quote the 
translation by Waterfield (1996).
17 For extremely helpful dis-
cussion of Aristotle’s philos-
ophy of mathematics see Lear 



































































world as it manifests itself to us – I think that many of the claims Aristotle 
makes are intelligible, perceptive and defensible. The very notion of an ex-
tensionless point as being constitutively dependent on the notion of a lim-
it of a line or of a part of a line, seems to make sense when we reflect on 
the way in which parts of the world are manifest to us in sense-percep-
tion. To the extent to which it makes sense to think of extensionless points 
as coming to awareness, they are manifest to us as the 
ends of lines or parts of lines. 18 And though this kind 
of approach to mathematical continuity – as a concep-
tion of the formal properties of the world as it is mani-
fest to us – instantly generates a range of further ques-
tions, this approach seems no less relevant to me than 
the kind of project that P. F. Strawson, in the introduc-
tion to his 1959 work Individuals famously described 
as “descriptive metaphysics”, and contrasted with “re-
visionary metaphysics”. Strawson says: «Descriptive metaphysics is con-
tent to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revi-
sionary metaphysics is concerned to provide a better structure» (1959, 9). 
Strawson describes Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley as revisionary meta-
physicians. Amongst late 20th century philosophers we could add David 
Lewis to this list.
Strawson offers Aristotle and Kant as examples of descriptive 
metaphysicians (1959, 9). That characterization, I think, is instructive. For 
it is suggestive about how we might expand the scope of what such a de-
scriptive approach to metaphysics might involve. 19 It is 
obvious from their work that Aristotle and Kant were 
not merely interested in the structure of our thou-
ght about the world, or the structure of the world as 
thought about. For the Physics and the Transcendental 
Aesthetic are, quite explicitly, investigations of the structure of the world 
as manifest to sense-perception and as manifest in temporal awareness.
Subject to this expanded conception of what descriptive metaphysics in-
volves, what Aristotle appears to be doing in Physics VI is sketching out a 
branch of descriptive metaphysics; that branch which concerns notions of 
quantity, counting, measuring and ordering. He is not engaging in a discus-
sion of the mathematics of continuity that is purely formal in the way that 
the set theory of Cantor, and his formalization of the notion of the contin-
uum, is. Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of form, structure, magnitude, 
and continuity in the Physics, quite generally, is to be constrained by how 
these structures show up in the way that the natural world is manifest to us.
It doesn’t follow from this that set theory shows that there is no 
place for such a project. Set theory and a descriptive metaphysics of manifest 
time are just different projects. The connection with the notion of descriptive 
metaphysics will no doubt strike some philosophers reading this as consti-
tuting even more of a reason to be suspicious about what Aristotle is up to in 
the Physics. I guess it’s obvious that I don’t share these suspicions. But I don’t 
have the time or space to say much more about these questions here.
There is a second sense, though, in which Aristotle’s discussions 
of continuity remain relevant even in the face of the idea that Cantor’s as-
sumptions about how the continuum ought to be formalized are conceded. 
18 And note further that where 
we understand these lines as 
themselves extensionless, in 
the sense that they lack breadth, 
these lines themselves mani-
fest themselves to us as the sur-
faces of manifestly space-fill-
ing objects, their boundaries, or 
the boundaries of their parts.
19 I do not imply that Strawson 
himself would have been happy 
with this catholicism about the 



































































This idea is related to some of the ideas I have just discussed. But it also in-
volves scrutiny of the extent to which Aristotle does – or does not – offer us 
a unified treatment of continuity in the text of the Physics. And it focusses 
in particular on the interest of Aristotle’s claims about continuity, specifi-
cally, his views about temporal continuity.
The most focussed discussion of the notion of continuity in the 
Physics is in Book VI, the first chapter of which Aristotle devotes entirely 
to arguments for the existence of continuous quanti-
ties. 20 This discussion concerns that notion of continu-
ity which we might call “mathematical continuity” or 
the notion of “the infinitely divisible”. More formally, ac-
cording to this view:
(MC) x is a continuity iff x cannot be divided into indivisible parts/x is divis-
ible into infinitely divisible parts.
In Book VI of the Physics, Aristotle offers a battery of arguments for the 
truth of this claim about spatial and temporal magnitudes. But I think that 
there is another conception of continuity that is central to Aristotle’s dis-
cussion in the Physics. This is a conception of continuity that is particularly 
associated with time, and a form of temporal continuity. This idea is bound 
up with Aristotle’s idea that time is continuous or infinite in the sense that 
it just goes on and on.
At III.6, 206a23- 206b3, Aristotle says:
But the way in which the infinite manifests itself is different in the case of time and the hu-
man race from what it is in the case of the division of magnitudes. Generally speaking, the in-
finite exists by one thing being taken after another. What is taken is always finite on its own, 
but always succeeded by another part which is different from it. But whereas in the case of 
magnitudes each part persists, in the case of time and the human race the parts cease to be, 
but in such a way that the process does not fail. 21
I think the idea that Aristotle is getting at here is that 
time is continuous because the “process” (the process 
in which the reality of time consists, presumably) “does not fail” that is, 
it does not come to an end. When one phase of process gives out, there is 
always another phase of process that follows it. So, we have this idea of a 
chain of occurrences, drinkings of coffee, walks to the shops, eating dinner, 
which is a continuous but never-ending narrative, a story which will in-
clude births, lives and deaths of different creatures of different species and 
which will take in the narratives of things both living and not living, which 
just goes on and on.
This notion of temporal continuity can be labeled “dynamic” in 
that it links the temporal continuity of something to the existence of an un-
ceasing succession of process-phases.
(DC) x is a temporal continuity iff the existence of x involves process-phas-
es always being succeeded by further process-phases in such a way that x 
does not come to an end.
20 For important discussions 
of continuity in the Physics see 
Bostock (1991) and White (1992).
21 Here I follow the transla-



































































In Physics Book III, it is this notion of dynamic temporal continuity, and the 
closely related notion of the “potentially infinite” that is 
on the surface of the text. 22 This is a notion of continu-
ity that is quite distinct from that which I called “math-
ematical continuity”. Mathematical continuity is a prop-
erty of a single magnitude and the relations between 
its parts. Dynamic continuity is not. Dynamic conti-
nuity has an important connection to the idea of process or occurrence. 
Mathematical continuity does not. Dynamic continuity is a property pos-
sessed by things with the logic of noncountable mass (things of which there 
can be more and more, for example time, process). Mathematical continu-
ity, understood here as it is by Aristotle as the property of a single bound-
ed magnitude, is not. One result of these observations is that at least with-
out some quite substantial further argument, the concession of Cantor’s 
views about mathematical continuity, that is, about the possibilities of un-
derstanding finite magnitudes in terms of sets of indivisible parts – even if 
we were prepared to waive the kind of defence of these ideas offered above 
– would be of very little direct consequence for this idea that time is a dy-
namic temporal continuity. For set theory has, on the face of it, nothing to 
tell us about the dynamic continuity of time. This notion of dynamic con-
tinuity plays an important role in Aristotle’s discussion of time and his dis-
cussion of the sense in which time is infinite. And it is of considerable inde-
pendent interest for contemporary debates in the philosophy of time.
4. Are there Any Important Differences According to Aristotle Between 
the Continuity of Space and that of Time?
In short, yes there are. Let me say a little bit about some of these differenc-
es, and why these are interesting. If we focus our attention just on the no-
tion of “mathematical continuity” that Aristotle discusses in Book VI, these 
differences won’t come into view. Aristotle thinks that both finite intervals 
of time and finite spatial magnitudes are mathematically continuous in the 
sense that I described earlier under (MC). That is, they are both infinite-
ly divisible.But once we move away from this notion of continuity, differ-
ences emerge. In connection with the notion of time, I described a proper-
ty that I described as “dynamic continuity” (DC) above). This was the idea 
that something is dynamically continuous if it consists of process-phase 
following process-phase, in such a way that the process never gives out. 
It is clear that this notion of dynamic continuity does not apply to spatial 
magnitudes. It is obviously not the case that spatial magnitudes consist of 
process-phase continuously following process-phase.
However, perhaps we might see this notion of dynamic continu-
ity as just the specific application to time of a notion of continuity or infin-
ity that does have application in the spatial domain. In the same way that 
the first notion of mathematical continuity was that of infinite divisibility, 
the idea that “we can always go smaller”, we might think that the notion of 
continuity of which dynamic continuity is a species is just that of the infi-
nite by addition; that is, the idea that “we can always go bigger”. And then 
the thought might be that there is an analogue of this truth in the spatial 
case. Just as it is true that for every process-phase, when it gives out, there 
22 For important work on the 
notion of the potential infinite 
see Hintikka (1966), Lear (1979) 
and for an excellent recent dis-



































































is always another that follows it, it might be thought that for every deter-
minate spatial magnitude that is traversed, once one reaches the far side, 
there is always another spatial magnitude ready to be traversed on the far 
side. For any spatial interval or magnitude, there is always more space on 
the other side of its boundary.
But Aristotle is very clear that he thinks that this claim about 
space, and indeed, material objects in space, is false. It is not true, accord-
ing to him, that space is unlimited in this way. He thinks that the spatial 
universe is bounded and finite. And there cannot be an actually infinitely 
extended body. On the other side of that boundary of the spatial universe 
there is simply nothing; where “nothing” does not just mean “empty space”. 
These are views for which Aristotle offers an array of baroque arguments 
in Physics, III.5.
This claim is the source of a number of difficulties for Aristotle. 
Aristotle appears, for example, to accept Euclidean geometry. But Euclidean 
geometry does seem to require us to make sense of the idea of the of a 
straight line that can be extended indefinitely. If the universe is spatially 
limited, at the very least there seems to be a tension with the idea that one 
can construct a line like that. (I think that there are things to say here in 
Aristotle’s defence, but I won’t go into them now). I think that much of the 
resistance to Aristotle here is not so much that we each individually could 
give a proof of the infinity of space, or spell out the physics that shows that 
it is, but that his views about the nature of these limits and his views about 
actually infinite bodies, do not seem to be supported by particularly persua-
sive argument – they seem to emerge from some extremely elusive a priori 
arguments in Physics III.5 – and they are also embedded within a geocen-
tric cosmology that we know to be false.
What’s really driving these claims about the finite nature of the 
spatial universe, and the impossibility of actually infinite objects? I think 
that this is a fascinating question. I suspect that here again we are seeing 
evidence of the fact that Aristotle is interested in manifest space, or space 
as it is presented to us in everyday sense-perceptual awareness. And while 
one might be impressed with the thought that at least as far as we move 
around on the earth, for every step across a distance we traverse, there is 
always another step we can take, so one also might have been impressed 
with the idea that whether one is in Macedonia, Athens, the islands of the 
Aegean or Chalcis, all of the action takes place “under one (visible) roof”; one 
vast cosmic container that seems to be the same con-
tainer wherever one is. 23 What’s particularly interesting 
for me here, amongst other things, is that it reveals the 
extent to which the central role in Aristotle’s accounts 
of continuity and infinity appears to be being played by 
temporal notions rather than spatial ones.That strikes 
one even more clearly when one looks more closely at 
Aristotle’s views about what it is for space to be math-
ematically continuous; that is, for a spatial quantity to be an infinitely di-
visible magnitude. For, at least on the face of it – and here there is another 
area around which there is extensive disagreement between commenta-
tors – Aristotle’s explication of this notion in Physics III.6 itself appears to 
depend crucially on temporal notions. In particular, it seems to involve the 
23 Acknowledging that it is “the 
same container” wherever one 
is, is consistent with acknowl-
edging that it does seem to move 
around in various predictable ways 
over time, and also seems to look 
slightly different to one depending 



































































idea that if one were to begin dividing up such a magnitude into smaller 
spatial parts, then for every spatial magnitude that might result from such 
a division, that process of division could always (in some way, in principle) 
be continued.
This raises questions both interpretive and philosophical about 
what «in some way» or «in principle» could possibly mean as applied to 
the extendability of such a process of division. 24 But 
whatever these further difficulties, it is very hard to 
come away from the discussions of continuity and in-
finity in Books III, IV and VI of the Physics without the 
sense that it is Aristotle’s views about time, and the various respects in 
which time is continuous and infinite, that are the real intellectual driv-
ing-force behind the discussion.
5. How Do You Think We Should Understand the Connection Between 
Time and the Soul that Aristotle Draws at the End of the Fourth Book 
of Physics? Does It Imply Some Sort of Idealism?
The idea that there are connections between time, the soul, and the activi-
ties of the soul, is a thread that runs through Aristotle’s discussion of time 
in the Book IV of the Physics. But there is a famous – or infamous – pas-
sage in which Aristotle discusses this question head-on. Here is the passage 
from Edward Hussey’s translation in the 1983 Clarendon Aristotle Series 
edition of the Physics Book III and IV. I have omitted just a couple of sen-
tences for ease of reading:
It is also worth investigating how time is related to the soul, and for what reason it is that time 
is thought to be in everything – on earth and in the sea and in the heavens… One might find 
it a difficult question, whether if there were no soul there would be time or not. For if it is im-
possible that there should be something to do the counting, it is also impossible that anything 
should be countable, so that it is clear that there would be no number either… But if there is 
nothing that has it in its nature to count except soul… then it is impossible that there should be 
time if there is no soul, except that there could be that X which time is, whatever X makes it 
what it is; as for example if it is possible for there to be change without soul. (Ph. 223a16-28)
Idealism about some subject-matter, say, ordinary commonsense objects 
like palm trees and peregrine falcons, is the view that such objects are in 
some way dependent on the mind or its activities (“activities” here is broad 
enough to include: experiences, beliefs, our capacities for describing the 
world in language, or broader cultural practices or institutions).Idealism is 
more plausible for some subjects than for others. For example, it would be 
odd to think of the property now being seen by Tom, as something inde-
pendent of facts about Tom and his experiences. But when it comes to such 
things as ordinary objects – or time, for that matter – philosophers have 
generally wanted to avoid being idealists. At least, philosophers within the 
kind of philosophical tradition in which I was raised have generally wanted 
to avoid idealism about such things, and taken realism – the view that such 
things are in some robust and meaningful sense independent of us and our 
activities – to be the default position.
What motivates this idea that realism ought to be the default 
24 See Lear (1979) for fascinat-



































































position? Some delicate questions about the nature of the distinction be-
tween realism and idealism lurk in the background here. But in advance of 
taking a necessarily brief look at questions of those kinds, we might iden-
tify several motivations. One crude thought is that even if all sentient be-
ings (on which the idealist may think the existence of the relevant objects 
putatively depends) were wiped out overnight, then there would remain 
a mind-independent world that contained objects and perfectly determi-
nate facts about them. Or we want to be able to think that it might have 
been that no sentient beings who developed the representational capacities 
and culture that we have ever developed, though nevertheless the world 
independent of the mind did, and remained determinate in very many of 
the ways that it is so now, even given that we do exist. And with respect 
to such putative truths about objects like “that object is six feet wide” or 
even “that person is shameless” we want to think that the truth of such 
things is constitutively independent of any decisions that I may make about 
how those things may be, or any desires I may have about whether such 
things are true. The very idea of the world is the idea of that to which our 
representations must conform, and against which our desires or decisions, 
at least in the kinds of cases I have described, don’t get 
a say. 25 Against this background, if someone says that 
your view commits you to a form of idealism about 
something, that is generally a bad thing, or a charge 
against you. It is a charge that you are generally under 
an obligation to show is misplaced.
The passage quoted above from the end of 
Physics IV has generated a great deal of discussion. One 
of the reasons for this is that the reader is likely to come 
away with the distinct impression that Aristotle is here 
saying that he is an idealist about time. Indeed, he seems to be offering an 
argument for that conclusion. An assumption of the passage appears to 
be that the notion of time is – or at least involves – the notion of what is 
countable. The next step appears to be that the only thing that has the abil-
ity to count is a soul. And then Aristotle seems to suggest that it follows 
from these ideas that were there no souls (with their abilities to count) 
then there could be no time.
Because many of us think that idealism about time is something 
to be avoided, and because all interpretation, even when the subject is not 
one of the greatest philosophers in history, is informed by some kind of 
Principle of Charity, there is a pressure on the part of the reader to find 
something here beyond the initial appearances. An additional motivation 
in this case is that the argument that I have just briefly reconstructed for 
the dependence of time on the soul looks pretty poor. 26 
Some philosophers have attempted to argue that the 
appearance that Aristotle is offering an argument for 
the idealism of time here is just that: an appearance, 
and nothing more. It is true that the text is not unprob-
lematic. This is Aristotle writing after all. The argument 
consists largely of a series of conditionals about what 
would or might be the case, without a clear statement 
of the truth of the antecedent of these conditionals, and 
25 Of course, any fully satisfy-
ing specification of the way in 
which truths about the world are 
independent of our decisions and 
desires will need to be appropri-
ately sensitive to the many ways in 
which our wills can manifest itself 
in changes in the facts, from my 
decisions about how to move my 
body or how to move parts of the 
world through moving my body.
26 As I presented it, the argument 
seems to be invalid. As recon-
structed, it says that O (time) has 
the property of being F (depend-
ent on a soul) because a feature 
of a soul that counts O (the capac-
ity to count) has the property of 
being F (dependent on a soul). But 
that doesn’t follow. O (time) and 
a feature of a soul that counts O 
(the capacity to count) are distinct 



































































a clear endorsement or assertion of the idealist conclu-
sion. There are those also who believe that Aristotle in-
tends the reader to see that the argument that he of-
fers here is a bad one. Rather – so the thought goes 
– the reader is intended to think that just as there can 
be change independent of the soul – as ventured in the very final sentence 
of the quoted passage – so also can there be time without the soul.I don’t 
have the time here to explain my reasons for thinking that this approach is 
mistaken. One very basic worry, though, is that Aristotle has gone to con-
siderable pains earlier in Book IV to emphasize that while there is an im-
portant connection between time and change, they are not the same thing. 
Therefore it is unclear why he would expect or intend the attentive read-
er to generalize these claims about the mind-independence of change to a 
claim about the mind-independence of time.
So I am not quite convinced that this is the best way with this 
passage. To engage a bit more fully with the question, let me try make a 
more positive suggestion. This will require me to say something a bit more 
general about “Aristotle’s idealism” in Physics Book IV, 10-14. Even if I don’t 
have the time to apply this in detail to the passage, it will generate some 
ideas about what that treatment might look like.
Idealism itself is not so much a position or an idea as it is a family 
of positions or ideas. Idealism centrally involves some kind of mind-depen-
dence claim. But there are different kinds of mind-dependence claims that 
can be made. Some of them are more nuanced and worthy of consideration 
than others, and idealist claims about some subject matter might be able to 
co-exist with at least some of the intuitions that motivate the assumption 
that we ought to be realists about that subject matter.
Here is an example from a different area. A suggestion that has 
been made in subtly different ways in the literature about value properties 
(for example, goodness of a certain kind) is that an object is good in the rel-
evant sense in so far as it merits a positive evaluative judgement or positive 
evaluative response from an appraiser. Given this view, one understands 
what it is for an object to have the relevant property in a way that involves 
making essential reference to certain kinds of evaluative responses by sub-
jects. So on this approach there is an element of “idealism” (or “subjectiv-
ism”) involved in the understanding of what it is for some property to be 
the very property it is.
But note that it doesn’t follow from this that whether or not 
something is good or not is something that can be decided or stipulated by 
some individual evaluator, or that things don’t have particular value prop-
erties independent of the contingent attitudes that a community of evalua-
tors happens to have. For even if I judge that this object is good, it may nev-
ertheless be the case that this object is not such as to merit such positive 
appraisal from an evaluator. This is to say that “mind-dependence” about 
understanding an object, property or phenomenon can come apart from 
“mind-dependence” about the existence of such a thing or the instantiation 
of such a property in the mind-independent world.
And this is relevant because, as I have alluded to above, one might 
think that what is really troubling about idealism, and what we really ought 
to care about resisting, is mind-dependence in this latter sense. We don’t 
the argument, as I see it, is a rea-
son to suspect that whatever else 
may be going on in this passage, 
an argument of this degree of cru-



































































want to think that the facts about ordinary commonsense objects and their 
properties are determined simply by our desires or decisions, or that there 
is no difference between an asteroid wiping out all sentient life, and wiping 
out everything there ever is or could be. But the moral of the kind of pro-
posal just considered is that we can resist this kind of problematic idealism, 
even if our views about how to understand the relevant facts about those 
objects incorporate a form of idealism or subjectivism.I suspect that the 
kind of idealism about time that emerges in Physics IV.10-14 can be more 
helpfully understood in terms of the kind of idealism 
that I have just spent time describing. 27 From this per-
spective, Aristotle would be advancing the claim that it 
is not possible to understand what time is without mak-
ing reference to certain kinds of capacities of souls; spe-
cifically, the capacities for counting (including count-
ing changes, and counting what he calls «the nows»). 
But that would be consistent with the idea that the existence of determi-
nate countable changes of various kinds, and determinate facts about the 
«countable nows» is independent of the existence of particular souls who 
are doing any counting or measuring of changes or «nows». It should be 
noted that if one is attracted to this approach, then one important task is 
to give an account of the way that Aristotle couches his dependence claims 
in the paragraph with which I began my response to this question. For the 
critics may observe that contrary to the kind of story I have been trying to 
tell, Aristotle seems to make precisely the kind of dependence claims that 
I have said are the particularly problematic ones (e.g. «it is impossible that 
there should be time if there is no soul» (Phy. 223a26)). It is the existence 
of time that is said to be dependent on the soul, not an understanding of 
what it is, it might be objected. This is an interesting challenge, and it raises 
many further questions.
Let me end just by making a few observations. An obvious point 
to make in response is to note how natural it is to express even the claims 
about the mind-dependence of understanding in existential terms. If one 
is speaking loosely, it is fairly natural to describe even the more nuanced 
form of idealism discussed above in existential terms («If there were no 
practice of evaluative judgement there would be no goodness or badness») 
even though these existential constructions are elliptical for the richer in-
telligibility claim. It’s also not irrelevant to this question, I think, to note that 
as Aristotle’s philosophy matures, the very notion of “to be” (na einai) be-
comes crucially connected to the very idea of what can be made intelligi-
ble or understandable. Even if the Physics is a less mature work than the 
Metaphysics (where such a use of “to be” achieves its most articulate and 
developed form) what we may have here is an earlier example of a “to be” 
construction, in which the sense of it is not primarily “to exist”, but to “be 
intelligible or understandable”.
27 If I understand him right, this 
is the kind of suggestion that 
is made by Jonathan Lear in his 
fascinating discussion of Physics 
IV.10-14 in his book Aristotle: 



































































Suggestions for Further Reading
Aristotle, Continuity and the Infinite
I would suggest that the interested reader start with Aristotle himself. The 
following translation is very good, and an excellent place to begin:
Aristotle Physics. Transl. by Waterfield, R., with notes from Bostock, D. 
(1996). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
The following edition of the Clarendon Aristotle series focuses on Books III and IV. 
Edward Hussey’s notes are excellent:
Aristotle Physics Books III and IV. Transl. with notes by Hussey, E. (1983). 
Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
If you want to investigate Aristotle’s philosophy of time in more detail, two particu-
larly important recent studies of Aristotle on time can be recommended: 
Coope, U. (2005). Time for Aristotle, Physics IV.10. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Roark, T. (2011). Aristotle on Time: A Study of the Physics. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Here are three texts that include excellent discussion of issues relating to continui-
ty and the infinite in ancient philosophy from the point of view of contemporary re-
search on the philosophy of time.
Sorabji, R. (1983). Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity 
and the Early Middle Ages. London, Duckworth Press.
This is a tour-de-force of a book, introducing ancient theories of time and the con-
tinuum and assessing their significance for contemporary research. It is relevant to 
many of the issues touched on in the discussion above.
Moore, A.W. (2019). The Infinite. 3rd ed. London, Routledge.
The first section of this book, which is now in its third edition, is an extremely help-
ful historical overview of the history of the notion of the infinite (to which notions 
of continuity are inextricably linked). Sections two and three contain excellent dis-
cussion of the infinite from one of the most interesting philosophers working today.
And finally:
White, M. J. (1992). The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical 
Theories from a Contemporary Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
White’s text is difficult, but very rewarding.
If I had to recommend one book on Aristotle for those who are interested 



































































Lear, J. (1988). Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Jonathan Lear’s book is a substantial work of philosophy in its own right, in addi-
tion to being an outstanding general overview of Aristotle’s philosophy. It contains 
particularly stimulating discussions of Physics Book III and IV. My own views about 
Aristotle’s discussion in Physics, Book IV (particularly about ‘the now’, which I have 
not said much about here) and my view that there are two different notions of con-
tinuity at work in the Physics—which I have said something about here—owe much 
to a few suggestive remarks of Lear’s in this text.
Time and the Temporal
For very helpful basic introduction to contemporary philosophy of time, from a 
B-theoretic perspective, see: 
Bardon, A. (2013). A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
For those who want to go deeper into contemporary philosophy of time, I would sug-
gest that one reads the papers collected in section C of:
Van Inwagen, P and Zimmerman, D. (2008) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. 2nd ed. 
Oxford, Blackwell.
Essential reading here must be the late Hugh Mellor’s follow-up to his own 1981 book 
Real Time, a book that sparked so much interest in the philosophy of time in the late 
20th century. This is:
Mellor, D.H. (1998). Real Time II. London, Routledge.
Even if one disagrees with Mellor, there is an extraordinary amount of interesting 
philosophy here.
There is a great deal of work in contemporary philosophy of mind that lies 
at the intersection of philosophy of perception and the metaphysics of time. For a 
very valuable collection of essays that includes introductions to research on the na-
ture of temporal experience as well as substantial contributions to that research, see:
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